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1. The subject 
The research aims to trace the evolution of the litigants’ duty to discover the 
information relevant to a civil proceeding. This duty is present in the Anglo-American 
tradition but is, in contrast, absent in the European continental tradition, where even the 
word “discovery” has an exotic and unknown flavour.  
The research makes (I hope) a small contribution to the subject of the convergence 
between the laws of procedure of common law and civil law jurisdictions, the two 
fundamental families that have permeated almost all current procedural systems.  
 
With the idea that knowledge of the past is vital for an understanding of the present and 
future, the research has three specific objectives. 
1) The first objective is to examine the origins of the duty to discover. Discovery was 
injected into the common law system only by the Act of 1854, and had its origin in a 
quite different model of process, the proceedings of the English Chancery court, 
strongly influenced by the continental tradition of the Romano-canonical model. 
To most people, who see the machinery of discovery as quintessentially Anglo-
American, the realisation of this historical fact may come as a shock. Yet, a fact it is. 
Nobody will deny that discovery has indeed developed in the course of the centuries 
into a peculiarly Anglo-American (above all, American) phenomenon. Nevertheless, at 
its very beginning discovery was unrelated to common law and was, on the contrary, 
connected to civil law. 
2) The second objective, more ambitiously, seeks to find the answers to two correlated 
questions. The first question is about the factors that have transformed the Anglo-
American discovery of pre-modern England in the contemporary machine. If the 
machinery of discovery was, at the beginning, unconnected with the culture of 
“adversarial legalism”, it is now one of its most impressive manifestations. 
The second question, a mirror of the first, is why European continental systems, which 
historically had something similar to the duty to discover, gave up this tendency toward 
the ascertainment of truth and adopted the principle “nemo tenetur edere contra se.” 
3) The third objective is, first of all, to use the results of historical investigation in order 
to better understand the latest reforms in the Anglo-American world and in the 
continental European world. If in the U.S. and in England there is a tendency to limit 
discovery abuses by strengthening the court’s management powers, in Europe there is a 
tendency to introduce limited duty to disclose information.  
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Secondly, the results of the investigation will be helpful in building a notion of the duty 
to discover that is acceptable to both civil law and common law countries. 
 
In the following sections you will find explanatory material on single issues of the 
research. Sections 2, 3, 4 are devoted to preliminary issues, which form the starting 
point of the research. The remaining sections are dedicated to the three objectives of the 
research.  
In the appendix, you may read information about three films which will give us, through 
showing a few of their images at the presentation, an idea of trial and discovery in a 
current U.S. civil court on the one hand, and of a hearing in the 19th century English 
Chancery court on the other.  
 
 
2. Anglo-American and European continental civil proceedings: key features 1 
The common law process has been developing since the 12th century in the English 
royal courts and presents three fundamental structural features:  
• enlistment of lay judges – the jury – in the administration of justice; 
• temporal concentration of proceedings around the “day-in-court” trial; 
• prominence of the parties, or, rather, of their counsels in the procedural action. 
Opposite the features of the civil law process - heir to the so-called Romano-canonical 
procedure (i.e., the procedure which, ultimately derived from the late-Roman 
professional procedure, was developed in the Church courts and by the 13th century was 
adopted in continental secular courts) - this process: 
• is entirely professional; 
• does not involve trials; 
• places the judge in the pivotal role. 
 
As a consequence, common law and civil law jurisdictions have different styles of 
evidence-taking: 
• In the Anglo-American systems we have an adversarial presentation of evidence 
by battling lawyers in which witnesses are examined and cross-examined by the 
lawyers and experts are presented by the parties on the same basis as other 
witnesses. 
• In the European-continental process, conversely, it is the court that conducts the 
examination of the witnesses and appoints the experts. 
                                                
1 For some useful remarks see J.A. Jolowicz, On the Comparison of Procedures, in Law and 
Justice in a Multistate World, New York, 2002, 721-740; and R.A. Kagan, Adversarial 
Legalism, Cambridge, 2001. 
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These differences are gradually vanishing (cross-examination is a technique no longer 
unknown in civil law jurisdictions, and the appointment of an expert by the judge is 
provided by a common law system like the English one).  
One deep difference remains: in the Anglo-American systems, the parties are compelled 
to disclose all relevant information, while in continental Europe systems the parties do 
not have a similar duty. 
 
 
3. Discovery rules in comparison 
• United States 
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938 (rules 26-37), the attorneys for the 
parties may, before the trial, require virtually any data that can reasonably be anticipated 
to lead to evidence that will be admissible in the litigation. 
Here is the impressive list of discovery devices: 
1. deposition by oral examination and cross-examination of a deponent as they 
would be at trial or by written questions; 
2. interrogatories to parties; 
3. producing documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things; 
4. entering onto land, for inspection or other purposes; 
5. physical and mental examinations; 
6. request for admission. 
In the words of the Supreme Court in the leading case Hickman v. Taylor (1947): 
“mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to 
proper litigation; to that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever 
facts he has in his possession.” 
 
• England 
In England, discovery traditionally relates to the production of documents only. 
Under the Civil Procedure Rules (1998), part 31, the party of a civil proceeding has to 
disclose “the documents on which he relies and the documents which adversely affect 
his own case (..) or support another party’s case.” 
 
• France  
In France, the so-called new code of civil procedure (1975) contemplates that each party 
has the duty to contribute to the ascertainment of truth (Article 11). A party and a non-
party can be required to give evidence and to produce documents by the judge. The 
party has to apply to the judge for such an order and it will be granted only if the 




The German system is more restrictive than the French one. The Zivilprozessordnung 
allows an order for production of documents against the will of a party only if she has a 
duty according to substantive law to produce the document to the other party (§ 442 
ZPO). A new rule came into effect in Germany on January 1, 2002, allowing an order 
for the production of documents against a non-party.  
 
 
4. Discovery of documents: a case of international “Justizkonflikt” 
The subject plays a significant role in contemporary transnational litigation. 
Not surprisingly, the controversy pits the United States against European countries, 
(even England has been at the forefront in diverging from American-style discovery 
requests, labelled as “fishing-expeditions”). 
  
Two decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court are explanatory examples of this international 
contrast:  
• The Aérospatiale case 2 
The background of the decision: In 1980, an aircraft crashed in Iowa and a suit was 
brought against two French corporations owned by the Republic of France alleging that 
they had manufactured and sold a defective plane. The plaintiffs served, in the pre-trial 
phase, a request for the production of documents, a set of interrogatories, and requests 
for admission. The defendants filed a motion for a protective order, invoking the 
application of the Hague Convention on the taking of evidence abroad (under which it is 
possible to block the “discovery of documents as known in common law countries,” see 
article 23). The motion was denied. The French corporations appealed. The Court of 
Appeals rejected the appeal. The corporations then sought review of the decision by the 
Supreme Court.  
The Supreme Court stated that the Hague Convention represents merely an auxiliary 
instrument, whose application requires “a prior scrutiny in each case of the particular 
facts, sovereign interests and likelihood that resort to those procedures will prove 
effective.” 
• The Intel Corporation v. AMD case 3 
The underlying fact scenario: Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), the historical 
competitor of Intel Corporation, the world-wide leader in computer devices, in October 
2000 took action before the European Commission, charging Intel with violating the 
anti-trust rules of the European Treaty, article 82. AMD requested the Commission 
                                                
2 Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale versus United States District Court for the 
Southern District of Iowa (1987). Comments on the decision, amongst the most famous and 
controversial in private international law, are countless. 
3 Intel Corporation versus Advanced Micro Devices (2004). For a comment see my Discovery 
all’estero: un nuovo capitolo del confronto tra Europa e Stati Uniti, in Il diritto processuale 
civile internazionale, edited by Consolo and De Cristofaro, Milano, 2006, 1387-1397. 
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order Intel to produce documents covered by a privacy order produced in another anti-
trust action in the U.S. The motion was denied by the Commission. 
AMD served the request for the production of the documents to an American court, the 
California Northern District Court. The District Court denied the motion. AMD then 
appealed and the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit granted the motion. Intel sought 
review of the decision by the Supreme Court. 
The Supreme Court decided that 28 U.S.C., section 1782(a) - which provides that an 
American court may order a person residing or found in the district to give testimony or 
produce documents “for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal (..) 
upon the application of any interested person” - authorized a federal court to provide 
assistance to a complainant in a European Commission proceeding, leaving the District 
Court to decide whether assistance was appropriate in this case. 
 
 
5. The origins of the duty to disclose  
The Chancery procedure was totally different from the common law one. It: 
• was entirely professional; 
• did not involve trials; 
• placed the Chancellor in the pivotal role 4.  
Why? The motive usually referred to is the fact that the chancellors of the late middle 
ages, who were ecclesiastics until Tudor times, formed the procedure of their court after 
the model of the Romano-canonical procedure 5. 
 
Taking of evidence 6:  
• as in the Roman-canon process, the Chancellor had to be the seeker of truth and 
was responsible for evidence taking;  
• witnesses, instead of being orally examined at trial, were examined on oath 
under the control of the court, with the examination to be carried out by court 
                                                
4 St. German was the first English author (his Little Treatise concerning writs of subpoena, 
published in 1787, was probably written in 1532) to give an account of the equitable jurisdiction 
of the Chancellor. In the Little Treatise St. German focused his attention on the writ of 
subpoena and the practical operation of the Chancellor’s equitable jurisdiction (see D.E. Yale, 
St. German’s Little Treatise concerning writs of subpoena, 10 Irish Jurist, 1975, 324-333). 
5 Despite its frequent claims to uniqueness, common law drew on the Roman-canon legal 
tradition. On the migration or borrowing of doctrinal concepts from the Romano-canon by the 
Anglo-American system see P. Stein, Roman Law in European History, Cambridge, 1999; R.C. 
Van Caenegem, The Birth of the English Common Law, II ed., Cambridge, 1988, European Law 
in the Past and the Future. Unity and Diversity over Two Millennia, Cambridge, 2000; C.H. 
Van Rhee, Civil Procedure: A European Jus Commune?, European Review of Private Law, 
2000, 589-611. 
6 M. Mac Nair, The Law of Proof in Early Modern Equity, Berlin, 1999. 
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officers on interrogatories supplied by the parties, and with the result kept secret 
until publication. 
 
The subpoena ad respondendum and duces tecum 
A key feature of the proceedings was the request to the defendant to answer the 
plaintiff’s allegation 7. In this mechanism – a writ of subpoena ad respondendum - by 
which the defendant was forced to make a disclosure under oath regarding all the 
matters charged in the bill and to even produce documents “for the better discovery of 
the matters,” the so-called subpoena duces tecum, is identified as the ancestor of the 
modern discovery. 
According to the authoritative opinion of Wigmore 8 - the leading American scholar on 
evidence 9 , the Chancery subpoena ad respondendum had its antecedent in the 
inquisitional or interrogatory oath introduced and developed in the early 1200s, chiefly 
by the decretals of Innocent III. 
The historical continuity between the canon law oath de veritate dicenda and the later 
methods of discovery in Chancery has been traced in the endorsement of a bill in 
Chancery in Henry IV’s time (“Infrascriptus Ricardus in Cancellaria Regis personaliter 
comparens & ibidem super sancta Dei evengelica juratus et examinatus ad veritate 
dicendam de materia in hac billa contenta dicit quod”). 
 
 
6. Reasons for an opposite evolution: the Anglo-American systems 
As to the Anglo-American evolution of discovery, my thesis is that a central role was 
played by empirical philosophy and the underlying idea that to reach a rational decision 
the court must have all knowable facts.  
 
My points: 
• Barbara Shapiro 10 has demonstrated the links between law and the scientific 
revolution in the 16th and 17th centuries 11. The scientific revolution was not 
                                                
7 A. Daimond, Discovery in the court of Chancery: the rule that a defendant who submits to 
answer must answer fully 1673-1875, dissertation, Cambridge, 1992. 
8 J.H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Boston, vol. 8, 1961, 273-278. On a 
different line H. Coing, English Equity and the Denuntiatio Evangelica of the Canon Law, 71 
Law Quarterly Review, 1955, 223. 
9 W. Twining, Theories of Evidence: Bentham and Wigmore, London, 1985. 
10 The subject has been investigated by Shapiro since 1970t (see John Wilkins 1614-1672, 
Berkeley, 1970; Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England, Princeton, 1983; 
Beyond reasonable doubt and probable cause. Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American 
Law of Evidence, Berkeley, 1991; A Culture of Fact. England, 1550-1720, Ithaca-London, 
2000). 
11 The link between the emergence of modern science and Puritanism in 17th century England is 
the central theme of the so called Merton thesis, enunciated by the sociologist Merton in his 
doctorate thesis of 1938, which has been discussed continually through more than half a century 
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confined to a narrow group of professional scientists. Not only was there no 
such professional category, but those with scientific interests and 
accomplishments came from many different professional and non-professional 
groups, among whom lawyers were numerous. 
• The close connection between the philosophy of empiricism and the ideology of 
the discovery machine is evident in the two fundamental moments in the history 
of Chancery proceedings (its consolidation and its ending) and is related to two 
leading philosophers and lawyers, Francis Bacon and Jeremy Bentham. 
  
Bacon (1561-1626) 
Bacon was a central figure in the scientific revolution of the 17th century. He was also 
one of the leading lawyers and jurists of his day and was appointed Chancellor in 1617  
12, when the Chancery court began to consolidate its proceedings and had contributed to 
improving the details of the system 13.   
Bacon’s “obsession” with the collection of facts is well known and he spoke about 
discovery in these terms: “you must know that all subjects, without distinction of 
degrees, owe to the king tribute and service, not only of their deed and hand, but of their 
knowledge and discovery (..) if they be called and examined, whether it be of their own 




Educated at Westminster and Queen’s College, Oxford, and called to the Bar at 
Lincoln’s Inn, Bentham abandoned practice at the bar in disgust and devoted the rest of 
his life to the criticism and reform of legal, political, and social institutions on the basis 
of the Principle of Utility. When he died he had probably written more then any other 
English jurist before or since 14.  
The importance of facts for Bentham is undoubtedly known. Let us think of Mr 
Gradgrind, Dickens’s caricature of a Utilitarian: “All I want is Facts. Facts alone are 
wanted in life.” (Hard Times, 1854) 
 
The importance of the Anglo-American “culture of fact” to the evolution of the 
discovery machine is confirmed by the U.S. experience: 
• the American civil proceeding was modelled on the English one; 
                                                                                                                                          
of approval and disagreement, right down to the present day (Puritanism and the rise of modern 
science, edited by B. Cohen, New Brunswick-London, 1990). 
12 Bacon’s career as a Chancellor did not end happily: in 1621 he was indicted on charges of 
bribery and forced to leave the office. 
13 R.W. Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective, New York, 1952, 
29. 
14 W. Twining, Globalization & Legal Theory, London, 2000, 91-107. 
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• the distinction between common law and equity courts was abolished in the 
middle of the 19th century; 
• with the abolition of the equity courts, discovery (limited to documents) was 
taken in by the common law process. 
 
A central role was played by David Dudley Field, the author of the 1848 New York 
State Code of Civil Procedure 15 (soon adopted by the other 27 States).  
Field, who loved science, was drawn to the word “facts” and believed that one should 
try to determine objective reality, just like a scientist 16. 
 
1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 
• Clark, the main author of the Federal Rules, had a “realistic infatuation” with 
facts, and at the heart of his empirical work was the quest to ascertain relevant 
information 17;  
• discovery reform must be put in the broader context of procedural jurisprudence 
of the time (which considered it modern to eliminate lines and categories and to 
permit the amassing of information), the legal realist movement (which stressed 
the importance of amassing all the facts before deciding 18) and the New Deal 19.  
 
 
7. The continental abandon of the tendency toward truth 
The Roman-canonical procedural model prevailed on the continent of Europe 
throughout the ancien régime and survived the French Revolution. 
 
An example is the civil procedure in the Great Council at Malines in the 16th century 20. 
The Great Council was one of a group of newer central royal courts operating with 
basically Romano-canonical procedural forms, which developed in parallel in several 
European countries towards the end of the middle ages and in the early modern period. 
Other examples include the parliament of Paris, the German Reichskammergericht, and 
the English equity courts.  
                                                
15 S.N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions allowed: the Historical Background of the 1938 Federal 
Discovery Rules, 39 Boston College Law Review, 1998, 696; D.S. Clark, The Civil Law 
influence on David Dudley Field’s Code of civil procedure, in The reception of continental 
ideas in the common law world 1820-1920, edited by Reimann, Berlin, 1993, 63-87; L.M. 
Friedman, A History of American Law, New York, 1973, 340 ff. 
16 S.N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, 135 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, 1987, 935.  
17 S.N. Subrin 1987, 967-968. 
18 B. Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence, Oxford, 2007. 
19 S.N. Subrin 1998, 739-740. 
20 C.H. Van Rhee, Litigation and Legislation: Civil procedure at First Instance in the Great 
Council for the Netherlands in Malines (1522-1559), Brussels, 1997.  
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At the beginning of the 19th century, continental scholars, mainly Germans, constructed 
a rigorous model of the lawsuit as a dispute of two autonomous parties before a passive 
court 21.  
The civil process was to be governed by very broad notions of party autonomy – the 
two principles of Dispositionsmaxime and Verhandlungsmaxime – and the party 
dominance over lawsuits was indisputable. 
 
As a consequence, the earlier emphasis of Roman-canonical authorities on the discovery 
of truth was greatly weakened:  
• the judge was resolutely denied any power to call witnesses on his own; 
• it was widely accepted that a party had no obligation to make truthful 
allegations, and only minimal, if any, obligations were imposed on litigants to 
produce relevant documents to the court. 
 
The liberal model of civil procedure did not have a long life, and since the end of the 
19th century many continental countries have passed legislation centered on the 
development of judge powers.  
However, these reforms did not provide broader discovery duties.  
 
 
8. Towards the convergence: the present 
Anglo-American systems 
• U.S. discovery reforms of 1980, 1983, 1993, and 2000 
There is a good deal of discontent in the United States with the current practice of 
discovery, and there has been a continuous re-examination of the rules. The first episode 
included changes to the Federal Rules in 1980 and 1983 (amendments required judges 
to undertake some managerial action in most cases). Other changes occurred in 1993 
and in 2000 (amendments imposed numerical limits on depositions and interrogatories, 
a new “initial disclosure” duty, and involved the judge more at the outset of discovery). 
 
• English Civil Procedure Rules (CPR) of 1998 
Lord Woolf – the father of the CPR – criticized discovery (“a hugely complicated and 
expensive exercise”) but accepted the basic desirability of discovery “because of its 
contribution to the just resolution of disputes.” He underlined that “a substantially 
greater control over the scale of discovery has to be exercised than at present.” Under 
the CPR usually only a limited discovery of documents is possible, the so-called 
standard disclosure. 
                                                
21 M.R. Damaška, Evidence Law Adrift, New Haven, 1997; The Faces of Justice and State 
Authority, New Haven, 1986. 
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The movement, which in some way moves the discovery devices away from the pure 
adversarial model, is not inconsistent with the “nature” of the machine, which was 
developed in the Chancery proceeding, and which was totally controlled by the court.    
 
European continental systems 
• Latest Dutch reform of the code of civil procedure (2002) 
Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering (RV), sections 843a and 843b (obligation to 
submit documents). 
 
• E.U. legislation 
Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, article 8, §1: 
“Member States shall ensure that, in the context of proceedings concerning the 
infringement of intellectual property rights and in response to a justified and 
proportionate request of the claimant, the competent judicial authorities may order that 
information (..) be provided by the infringer or any other person (..).” 
 
 
9. The future 
• Principles and Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure (1997-2004) 22 
Principle 16 (Access to Information and Evidence): “2. Upon timely request of a party, 
the court should order disclosure of relevant, non-privileged, and reasonably identified 
evidence in the possession or control of another party or a non-party. It is not a basis of 
objection to such disclosure that the evidence may be adverse to the party or person 
making the disclosure.” 
                                                
22 The American Law Institute (ALI) began the project in 1997. The idea (by Hazard and 
Taruffo, two academics, one American and the other Italian, specialized in Civil procedure) was 
to establish a model system of legal procedures for use in transnational commercial transactions, 
that would maintain the integrity of individual cultures and, at the same time, advance cross-
border cooperation. ALI was joined in 1999 by the European Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (Unidroit). In 2004 the Council of Unidroit formally adopted the Principles. The 
text of the Principles, together with Comments, may be read in Principles of Transnational Civil 
Procedure, Cambridge, 2006.  
 11 
 
Appendix: Images of civil proceedings  
 
 
• A Civil Action (1998) 
directed by Steven Zaillian 
with John Travolta and Robert Duvall 
 
Based on Jonathan Harr’s book, the film is a hybrid, a fictionalized representation of a 
non-fictional representation of actual historical events. 
The story: in 1982 a group of families in Woburn, Massachusetts, brought action against 
two large corporations, W.R. Grace and Beatrice Foods, for injuries due to the 
contamination of the town’s water supply. The families alleged that the toxic materials 
were carcinogenic and led to the leukaemia-related deaths of six children and one adult 
in a nearby neighbourhood. Following a seven-month trial, W.R. Grace was found 
liable for polluting the wells. A second phase of the trial was to consider whether the 
pollution caused the leukaemia cases, but W.R. Grace settled with the families for a 
reported $8 million. Beatrice Foods, which had owned a tannery on the Woburn site and 
retained liability for the plant, was found not responsible for any contamination by the 
presiding judge. 
The film, similar to a western, structures its narrative as a conflict between two 
individuals: the plaintiffs’ lawyer, Jan Schlictmann (John Travolta), and one of the 
defence attorneys, Jerome Facher (Robert Duvall)   
 
For a comment, D. Waldman, A Case for Corrective Criticism: A Civil Action, in Law 
on the Screen, Stanford, 2005, 201-230.  
Information about the “real” case, Anderson et al. v. Beatrice Foods et al., may be 




• Class Action (1990) 
directed by Michael Apted 
with Gene Hackman and Mary Elizabeth Mastrantonio 
 
The story: an aggressive personal injury lawyer, Jedediah Ward (Gene Hackman) files a 
suit against a carmaker (Argo Motors) on behalf of a client whose wife was killed when 
their car exploded into flames after a collision. Argo’s attorney is none other than 
Jedediah’s daughter, Maggie Ward (Mary Elizabeth Mastrantonio).  
Much of the pretrial “skirmishing” between father and daughter – again, the narrative is 
structured as a conflict between two individuals - involves “discovery” and we see the 
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abuse of two of the most useful discovery devices, depositions and motions to produce 
documents. 
The film is loosely based on the case of Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Company, involving a 
1972 Ford Pinto that exploded when it was rear-ended. The jury awarded the plaintiff 
$2.5 million in actual damages and $125 million in punitive damages. 
 
For comment see P. Bergman and M. Asimov, Reel Justice. The Courtroom Goes to the 
Movies, Kansas City, 1996, 270-276. 
 
 
• Bleak House (2005) 
directed by Justin Chadwick and Susanna White 
with Gillian Anderson and Charles Dance 
 
A typical, almost literal transposition of a classic by the BBC, this TV drama is based 
on one of Charles Dickens’ masterworks, Bleak House (1853).  
The novel is focused on an interminable suit in the High Court of Chancery, the case of 
Jarndyce and Jarndyce, and the connected lives of several characters well known to the 
readers (Esther Summerson, John Jarndyce, Mr. Tulkinghorn, Lady Dedlock, and so 
on). 
Dickens, who at the age of fifteen worked as a clerk to a solicitor and then became one 
of the best court reporters in London, was inspired by an actual suit concerning a 
contested fortune, the Jennens case, that had begun in 1798 and was still unsettled in the 
1850s. Also informing the novel was Dickens’ personal experience of Chancery. In 
1844 he had been plaintiff in five actions to restrain breaches of copyright of A 
Christmas Carol. 
 
See Trial and Error, edited by F.R. Shapiro and J. Garry, New York-Oxford, 1998; and 
W.S. Holdsworth, Charles Dickens as a Legal Historian, New Haven, 1929, 79-115. 
 
